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The oil shocks of the 1970s coincided with a number of economic disturbances.
However, it has been di±cult to develop models where oil shocks have a quan-
titatively important impact on the economy. In this paper, I show that the dis-
turbances in transportation caused by the oil shocks can signi¯cantly a®ect the
economy. I argue that changes in energy prices were responsible for a worldwide
slowdown in the growth of trade and may help explain the apparent change in the
price-trade elasticity. While tari®s have fallen steadily since 1970, trade growth
slowed in the mid-1970s and has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s. In a stan-
dard trade model, this pattern implies that the price-import elasticity increased
sharply in the mid-1980s. In this paper, I argue that the oil crises of the 1970s led
to higher transportation costs. In 1986 energy prices fell to their pre-crisis level,
reducing transportation costs and by extension trade barriers. I present a trade
model with an energy using transportation sector. In model simulations, I show
that total trade costs (transportation cost plus tari®s) are constant from 1974 to
1982. Once transportation costs are accounted for, the price-import elasticity no
longer needs to radically change. I also show that trade expansion since 1960 is
50 percent higher in a standard trade model that includes a transportation sector
compared to one that does not.
¤I thank James Schmitz, Jr., Thomas Holmes, Sami Alpanda, Adrian Peralta-Alva and seminar
participants at Louisiana State University for helpful comments. Kei-Mu Yi generously provided data.
11 Introduction
In 1973, OPEC imposed an oil embargo that signi¯cantly increased the price of energy.
Soon afterward, there were several major economic disturbances: Stock prices halved, a
severe worldwide recession began and productivity growth slowed.
While empirical studies often ¯nd that energy prices and output are related, it
has been surprisingly di±cult to develop models where energy prices are a quantitatively
important source of economic disturbances. Cochrane (1994) surveys models with oil
price shocks and concludes that they cannot account for much of observed macroeco-
nomic °uctuations. One important reason for this is that energy expenses represent a
small portion of production costs. Without a signi¯cant magnifying mechanism, energy
represents too narrow a channel to have large e®ects on macroeconomic variables.
I examine a channel that has not been explored before: transportation. Con-
suming most goods requires transportation to carry them to market, so disruptions in
transportation will a®ect other industries. Since transportation's energy intensity is
higher than that of the general economy (energy cost's share of revenue is double that of
the overall economy for most modes of transportation), it is an enormous user of energy.
In this paper, I show that the disturbances in transportation caused by the oil
shocks can signi¯cantly a®ect the economy. In particular, I study the e®ect of the
transportation channel on trade expansion. I argue that the oil shocks of the 1970s are
responsible for a worldwide slowdown in the growth of trade and may help explain the
apparent change in the response of trade to price changes.
A widely known development in the world economy is the large increase in the
share of output that is internationally traded. Worldwide exports as a share of output
has more than doubled since 1960. However, export share of output has not increased
steadily. After increasing during the 1960s, export share remained constant from the mid-
1970s through the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1980s, export share has been increasing.
During this period, trade policy has become less restrictive. Successive rounds
of General Agreement on Tari®s and Trade (GATT) negotiations have reduced tari®s.
However, standard trade models have had di±culty generating the intuitive explanation
that lower tari®s were responsible for this expansion of trade. While trade growth slowed
in the 1970s, tari®s have declined steadily since the late 1960s. A standard trade model
2with tari®s alone would have a di±cult time explaining this observation since it implies
the price-import elasticity increased sharply in the mid-1980s. Yi (2003) argues that the
elasticity would have had to have more than doubled to account for the data.
In this paper, I argue that changes in transportation costs can explain the appar-
ent change in the price-import elasticity. Transportation is an energy intensive industry
and it is di±cult for shippers to substitute away from energy as an input. As a result,
the oil shocks of the 1970s raised the cost of transportation and o®set the decline in
tari®s. Total trade costs (tari®s plus transportation costs) were constant beginning in
the mid-1970s. When energy prices began to fall in 1982 (collapsing in 1986), total trade
costs also fell.
This paper presents a general equilibrium model of trade with a transportation
sector. Trading goods requires a shipping technology that uses energy as an input. I
calibrate the model and run simulations using data on energy prices and tari®s.
In the simulated model, I show that trade costs do not decline from the mid-
1970s to the early 1980s. The energy price shocks of the 1970s led to an increase in
transportation costs of the same magnitude as the decline in tari®s. The pattern of
trade costs generated by the model are much closer to the observed pattern of trade
expansion. Once transportation costs are accounted for, the price-import elasticity no
longer needs to radically change.
I also show that accounting for falling transit costs signi¯cantly increases the
predicted amount of trade growth. The model implies trade expansion that is almost
50 percent higher than a model without transportation. Transportation industries have
developed a number of new technologies that have increased their productivity faster than
the general economy and reduced the cost of shipping goods. Since 1960, transportation
costs has been generally declining, reducing trade costs.
1.1 The Trade Slowdown
It is conventional wisdom that successive multilateral rounds of negotiations under GATT
have steadily reduced trade barriers since World War Two. Summarizing trade policy
into easily comparable statistics continues to be a controversial topic. One important
measure of trade policy, tari®s, have declined over the last 40 years. Figure One shows
3world export share of GDP and GATT tari®s for industrialized countries as compiled
by Yi (2003)1. The countries covered by the data in Yi (2003) account for about two
thirds of world trade over most of this period. After a large drop in the 1960s, tari®s
have fallen steadily since the early 1970s.
There is evidence that tari®s in the rest of the world follow a similar pattern.
Clemens and Williamson (2002) report the average import-weighted tari®s for 35 coun-
tries, including a signi¯cant number of developing countries. Tari®s have declined be-
ginning the late 1960s with a small increase in the mid-1980s.
It seems unlikely that tari®s alone can explain the trade slowdown in the 1970s.
Tari®s decline steadily in the 1970s without increasing trade share. Starting in the
mid-1980s, export share increases while tari®s decline at a similar rate as the 1970s.
1.2 Transportation and Trade
Transportation costs are a central theme in international trade theory. For example, their
decline are typically given a central role in the trade growth of the late 19th Century2.
The barriers that result from transportation costs are typically found to be as
large or larger than those from tari®s. Finger and Yeats (1976) study United States
Customs data from 1965 and ¯nd that transport costs are of a similar magnitude to
tari®s. According to Yi (2003), US tari®s in 1994 were 4.5 percent. Hummels (1999)
¯nds that US import weighted transportation costs were 3.9 percent in the same year.
While transportation costs are considered important, they have typically been
studied much less than tari®s. A major reason for this neglect is the lack of good data.
Systematic measures are either lacking or of poor quality. Hummels and Lugovskyy
(2003) argue that the one source of comprehensive international transportation data,
the IMF's CIF/FOB ratios, is very °awed. High quality and systematic customs data is
limited to a couple rich countries for recent time periods.
Even when they do exist, these data underestimate transportation costs since
they only account for one part of the logistics chain that cargo passes through. The
1I thank Kei-Mu Yi for his tari® data. Detailed information about sources is available in the Ap-
pendix.
2For example, see North (1958).
4usual measurement of these costs is the CIF/FOB ratio derived from customs data. This
measure misses the cost of moving cargo from the domestic production point to the port
of exit and from the point of entry to its point of consumption.
The domestic legs of the journey represent a signi¯cant portion of the cost. Rous-
slang and To (1993) examine data from the Input-Output tables for the United States
in 1977. They ¯nd that the import weighted nominal protection from domestic freight
is 3 percent of producer value compared to 5.2 percent for international freight. Sletmo
and Williams (1981) cite an OECD study that ¯nds that the inland portion accounted
for 40 percent of freight costs for goods shipped by sea in 1967. The US Department of
Agriculture's Grain Transportation Prospects contains data on the cost of transporting
grain from the US to Japan. Depending on the point of production and mode of trans-
portation, domestic freight accounts for 20 to 75 percent of the cost of shipping wheat to
Japan. Reichert and Vachal (2000) give detailed breakdown of the cost of shipping soy-
beans to Japan. Ocean freight represents about only a quarter of the total cost. Hauck
(1979) ¯nds that the ocean leg accounts for only 40 percent of the cost of shipping a
computer from Pittsburgh to Rome.
1.3 Energy and Transportation Costs
The oil shocks in the 1970s led to large and sustained increases in energy prices. Figure
Two shows the producer price of energy de°ated by the GDP de°ator in the United
States. After a slow decline during the 1960s, the price shot up by 50 percent in response
to the Oil Embargo in late 1973. Energy prices stayed at this level until they nearly
doubled in the late 1970s as a result of the second oil crisis. They declined from their
peak in the early 1980s and collapsed back to the pre-second oil crisis level in 1986. They
have generally declined since then.
Fuel prices are an important determinant of transportation costs. Lundgren
(1996) regresses fuel prices on bulk goods transportation costs. He ¯nds that the coef-
¯cient on fuel prices is signi¯cant and positive in explaining transit prices. For the coal
and grain trades between the US and Europe, a 1% increase in bunker fuel prices lead
to about a 0.4% increase in freight rates. In fact, the link between energy prices and
transportation prices is often explicit. In water shipping, a surcharge called a Bunker
5Adjustment Factor (BAF) is often added on to the cost of shipping. The BAF is linked
to the price of shipping fuel (known as bunker fuel), increasing the cost of shipping if
the price of fuel increases.
There is evidence that the energy price increases of the 1970s led to a substantial
increase in cost for shippers. Sletmo and Williams (1981) examine the accounts of
container liners engaged in the North Atlantic trade. \In 1972, fuel costs represented
only about 40 percent of container vessel operating costs (exclusive of fuel). Two years
later, fuel costs were 1.6 times higher than vessel operating costs." (p. 164)
When energy prices increase, transportation prices also tend to increase. Hum-
mels (1999) provides evidence that water transportation charges increased in the 1970s
concurrent with the oil crisis. Transportation cost data is generally fragmentary. How-
ever, Hummels (1999) does present two data sources that provide relatively long, con-
sistent series. The ¯rst comes from the German Ministry of Transport and the second is
US customs data.
The German Ministry of Transport has maintained a price index of liner shipping
rates for Germany and the Netherlands. There is a substantial, sustained increase in the
real cost of shipping in 1974. The cost falls below the pre-Oil Crisis level in 1986.
US customs data provides information about import prices and transportation
costs by product and year. Hummels (1999) regresses transportation costs against a
number of controls, including distance and year and commodity dummies. Holding
commodity and distance constant, he ¯nds that transportation costs increased in the
mid-1970s and declined after 1985.
Additional evidence comes from data from the Australian Bureau of Transport
and Regional Economics. Figure Three shows coastal water rates in Australia. They
follow the pattern of the US Customs data: Increasing in the mid-1970s and declining
in the mid-1980s.
Figure Four shows a measure of price, real revenue per ton-kilometer, for air
freight, barge, truck and rail transportation in the United States. Rail, barge and air
freight rates show a downward trend. However, air and barge rates increase in the 1970s
and continue to decline after the second oil crisis. The decline in rail rates slows during
the two oil crises and truck rates show a small increase during the second oil shock.
6While there were increases in transportation costs in the 1970s, overall trans-
portation costs have declined since 1960. At the aggregate level, customs data provides
evidence. Finger and Yeats (1976) ¯nds that United States nominal protection from
(trade-weighted) transportation costs in 1965 to be 9 percent of import value. Hummels
(1999) ¯nds that the 1994 value to be 3.8 percent. At a more disaggregated level, Lund-
gren (1996) examines freight rates in bulk commodity trade. He ¯nds that rates have
declined by almost 70 percent since the early 1950s.
Energy price changes have a large impact on transportation costs since they rep-
resent an important part of expenses in the transportation business. The modes of
transportation that are the most important for international trade tend to be more en-
ergy intensive than the rest of the economy. Nominal expenditure on energy was 6.8
percent of GDP in the business sector in 1997. The energy share of revenue was 12
percent in both water transportation and civil aviation in that year. (Energy share in
land modes is lower: eight percent for trucking and nine percent for railroads.)
Beginning in the 1960s, changes in transportation made energy a more important
input. Ocean shippers adopted a number of new technologies. A variety of automation
and remote control technologies allowed ships of all types to become larger and more
capital intensive. General cargo ships, those that carry distinct items such as manufac-
tured goods, began to containerize its cargo. On container ships, the cargo is placed in
large standardized boxes as opposed to break bulk ships, where each piece of cargo is
loaded into the hold individually.
Containerization made ships more vulnerable to fuel costs. Container ships can
be unloaded faster than break bulk ships, so they spend less time in port and a greater
share of their time at sea. Therefore, sailing at higher speeds has a bigger impact on
capital productivity for container ships. Increasing capital productivity (and reducing
capital costs) also became more important as ship sizes increased. Running more voyages
lowers a ship's capital cost per voyage. Container ships are usually built to be faster than
break bulk ships to maximize the number of voyages a ship can run in a year. However,
higher speeds require more energy use per weight carried than low speeds. Sletmo and
Williams (1981) note that in the early 1970s, service speeds nearly doubled on some
routes, doubling or tripling fuel consumption per unit of capacity.
7Since the 1960s, goods have been moving from low to high energy intensity modes
of transit. Shippers have shifted overland goods from railroads to trucks and overseas
goods from ships to airplanes. On average, about 75 percent of US foreign trade by value
was shipped by overseas modes (Air and water) between 1965 and 2000. Air freight's
share was 6.2 percent of import value in 1965 but now represents almost 25 percent.
Over this period, ocean shipping has declined 70 percent of import value to less than
half.
Energy prices pass through to the ¯nal cost of transportation since it is di±cult
for transportation industries to substitute away from energy. Energy's share of revenue
matches the price of energy very closely, indicating that shippers cannot substitute away
from energy, at least in the short term. The lack of substitutability of energy is a feature
of most industries. (Atkeson and Kehoe 1999)
Figure Five shows fuel share in various transportation modes compared with
energy prices. Each mode shows a similar pattern. Energy's share of revenue matches
the price of energy very closely, indicating that shippers cannot substitute away from
energy very easily.
In water shipping, one margin to reduce energy use is to reduce the speed of
a vessel. Running a vessel at a lower speed reduces the energy requirement to move a
load. While Sletmo and Williams (1981) provide evidence that some of the fastest vessels
did sail at lower speeds in the mid-1970s, they also argue that speed reductions do not
provide a very powerful margin for reducing costs. Reducing speeds increase capital
costs by lengthening voyages, reducing the number of voyages a ship can run. Engines
are designed to run at particular speeds and running at lower speeds can stress them.
In air freight, there are few margins to reduce energy use. Statistics Canada
(1993) discusses a number of measures taken to reduce energy costs, including changing
cruising altitudes and taxiing with one engine. The savings from these techniques seem
unlikely to provide much of a reduction in fuel use.
No work that I am aware of considers the e®ect of the oil shocks on the pattern of
trade expansion. Backus and Crucini (2000) examine the e®ects of oil shocks on terms
of trade. They draw some implications for trade balance, but are not directly concerned
with the historical expansion of trade.
8The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section Two presents the
model. Section Three de¯nes equilibrium and solves the model. Section Four calibrates
the model and presents the results. Section Five discusses extensions and concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Households
There are three countries each with an in¯nitely lived representative household. House-






where Ci(t) denotes consumption in period t for i 2 f0;1;2g. The associated price is
P i(t). Each country is endowed in each period with a constant amount of labor Ni. The
wage is given by W i(t)
2.2 Intermediate Goods Sector
There are two intermediate goods Ij for j 2 f1;2g. Countries 1 and 2 are industrial








If i = j then Ái
j > 0. If i 6= j then Ái
j = 0. The intermediate good with the same name
as the country (i = j) is called the domestic good for country i.
2.3 Energy Sector
The remaining country (i = 0) is an energy producer and owns technology to produce
an energy good E using labor:
E = µN
0 (2.3)
The price of energy in country i is P i
E(t).
92.4 Transportation Sector
The countries may trade the goods they produce with each other. Shipping intermediate
goods between the industrial countries requires a transportation technology. (Intermedi-
ate goods shipped to and energy goods shipped from the energy producer do not require
the technology.) This technology uses energy E and input of the domestic good IT,
which must be purchased at the country of origin. The input required to ship I units
of the intermediate good to the other country is given by I = Min(AEi;BIT) where A
and B are productivity parameters.
2.5 Final Goods Sector








The industrial countries each have a government that can impose an ad valorem (net
of transportation fees) tari® ¿i(t). The government gives the domestic representative
household transfers T i(t) and maintains budget balance in each period. Each country's










Households sell labor and purchase goods. There is no borrowing or lending. They





















i denotes the labor to producing energy for sale in country i.
Transportation ¯rms buy domestic goods and energy and sell exports. They face




































The de¯nition of equilibrium follows.
De¯nition 3.1. Given tari®s, an equilibrium is consumption, intermediate goods and
energy allocations and prices in each period such that:
1. Households solve their problem,
2. Transportation and energy ¯rms solve their problem,
3. The government balances its budget,
4. The allocation is feasible.
3.2 Solution
Since there are no dynamic links between periods, the equilibrium can be solved in
each period independently. The dynamic solution is the solution to a sequence of static
problems.
11Symmetry allows a closed form solution of the model. In the rest of the paper, I
impose symmetry between the two industrial countries. Under symmetry, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. If N1 = N2, ¿1 = ¿2 and Á1
1 = Á2
2, then P 1
1 = P 2
2
For interior solutions, equilibrium prices and quantities are given by the following.
In each period, I normalize P 1
1 = 1. Given the lemma, this implies that P 2
2 = 1. From
no arbitrage, we have P 1
2 = P 2


















Equilibrium quantities are given by the following equations.

































































































In the exercise that follows, I will feed in actual data on tari®s and energy prices over the
period 1960 to 2000. Therefore, I set µ such that the price of energy in each industrial
country is equal to the producer price of energy de°ated by the GDP de°ator for the
United States. Tari®s are the world tari® series from Yi (2003). I set the productivity
parameter for the domestic industrial goods Ái
i and the labor endowment for each country
Ni equal to one in each period.
There are three parameters that remain to be calibrated: ¾;A; and B. The value
of parameters A and B in 1960 are selected to match the energy share in transportation
in 1960 ES and the transportation cost as a percentage of the ¯nal cost TC. These









I use a value of 0.086 for ES, to match the 8.6 percent energy share in Canadian
Water Transportation in 1960. Water transportation is the most important mode of
transportation in international trade. During the 1960s and 1970s, about two thirds of
US imports (by value) arrived by water. In the 1990s, this number declined to about
a half as air transportation became more important. Land modes represent about a
quarter of import value. About 90 percent of trade (by weight) is transported by sea.
(Frankel 1990) Canada is the only country that I am aware of that provides detailed
statistics on revenue and costs in water transportation from 1960 on.
I use 0.158 as the value of TC. Waters (1970) examines data from the 1958
input-output tables and ¯nd that the nominal protection rate of transportation costs to
be 10 percent. Rousslang and To (1993) ¯nd that domestic freight costs account for 40
percent of the nominal protection from transportation costs. I scale up the value trade
costs to match this observation, giving a ¯nal value of 15.8 percent.
13There is productivity growth in the transportation technology. I use average
total factor productivity growth in transportation from O'Mahony (1999) minus total
factor productivity in the business sector from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The growth rate of parameter B, °B, is 0.7 percent a year. Murtishaw and Schipper
(2001) ¯nd that energy intensity in transportation in the United States has remained
almost constant. To keep energy intensity constant, I set the growth rate of the energy
parameter A, °A, equal to °B in each period.
There is considerable controversy about the trade-tari® elasticity. Estimates range
from 1 to 13. (Erkel-Rousse and Mirza 2002) While this elasticity a®ects how much trade
expands in response to changes in trade costs, it does not a®ect the model's predictions
of trade costs themselves. As a baseline, I use a value of 0.25, which corresponds to
an elasticity of 4. This the upper range of what is typically used in the international
business cycle literature. (Yi 2003)
The following table summarizes the calibration.
Table 1: Parameters
A(60) B(60) ¾ °A °B
91.91 6.94 0.25 1.007 1.007
4.2 Results
In this section, I report the results of the baseline calibration. In the simulation, total
trade costs are °at during the late 1970s. The model closely matches the behavior of
energy share in transportation and transportation costs.
Trade Costs
Figure Six plots the model's predictions for total trade costs. After falling rapidly during
the 1960s, trade costs remain constant from 1973 to 1982. To the extent that trade
expansion is the result of declining trade costs, the model indicates that trade expansion
should be °at over that period.
14Trade costs are °at due to an increase in transportation costs resulting from the
oil crises of the 1970s which counteracts falling tari®s over this period. The increase in
energy cost is large enough to cause transportation cost to rise despite growing produc-
tivity.
To show the contribution of energy prices and tari®s to total trade costs, Figure
Six shows trade costs predicted by the model under two counterfactual scenarios.
The \Tari®s Only" series shows predicted trade cost if transportation cost held
steady at the 1960 level. All of the decline in trade costs is due to falling tari®s.
The \No Energy" series shows the predicted trade cost if energy prices held steady
at the 1960 level. Trade costs in the model continue to fall throughout the late 1970s.
Energy prices cause trade costs to remain constant in the late 1970s and early 1980s rel-
ative to the model without energy. The productivity growth in transportation ampli¯es
the overall decline in trade costs that result from the fall in tari®s.
The model does miss somewhat with the timing of the upturn in trade share in
the 1980s. In the data, export share begins to expand in 1986. The model predicts that
trade costs begin to decline in 1983. While oil prices famously collapse in 1986, energy
prices fall from their second oil crisis peak beginning in 1983.
This discrepancy may be due to an increase in tari®s in the mid-1980s in non-
industrial countries. Clemens and Williamson (2002) examine import weighted tari®s
for a large number of countries, including developing countries. The behavior of average
tari®s follows the Yi series closely aside from a small spike in tari®s in the 1980s. The
spike is the result of increasing developing world tari®s that are not accounted for in the
Yi series.
Transportation Energy Use
The model matches the behavior of the transportation industry. Figure Seven shows
the energy share from the model against data from Canadian water transportation. The
energy share matches very closely. The model overshoots the energy share somewhat
during the second oil crisis, but otherwise matches the data closely.
15Transportation Cost
The model predicts a long run decline in transportation prices. As mentioned above,
data on transportation costs is fragmentary. However, the model's predictions about the
magnitude of the fall in transportation costs matches this fragmentary data closely.
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) ¯nd that 33 percent of the increase in trade that is
attributable to a fall in trade costs is due to declining transportation costs. The model
attributes 34 percent of the decline in trade costs to falling transportation costs.
Hummels (1999) ¯nds that import weighted transportation costs (on a FOB/CIF
basis) in the United States fell by 1.2 percentage points between 1974 and 1994. De°ating
its predictions by 40 percent (removing the inland leg) to place them on a FOB/CIF
basis, the model predicts a transportation cost decline of 1.1 percentage points.
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2002) ¯nd that import weighted transportation costs
(on a FOB/CIF basis) for United States manufacturing fell by 1.5 percentage points
between 1982 and 1992. The model predicts a transportation cost decline (on a FOB/CIF
basis) of 1.3 percentage points.
Trade Expansion
Bergoeing and Kehoe (2001) argue that \New Trade Theory" cannot account for the
expansion of world trade. They argue that changes in trade policy is the most promising
avenue for a theory of trade expansion. However, standard models using the price-import
elasticity estimated from the international business cycles literature do not predict the
level of trade expansion that is observed in the data. Yi (2003) argues that an elasticity
of 11 or 12 is required to generate actual trade expansion. Typically, the elasticities
closer to 2 to 4 are estimated in the data, although as discussed above the correct value
for this elasticity is controversial.
Productivity growth in transportation implies that trade costs fell by more than
the amount generated by falling tari®s alone. Therefore, trade expands more for a given
elasticity when transportation is added to the model.
Tari®s fell by about 10 percentage points from 1960 to 2000 according to Yi (2003).
In the baseline calibration, changes in transportation yield an additional 4 percentage
points decline in trade costs. The model predicts that trade costs fell by about 40 percent
16more than that which can accounted for simply with tari®s.
Total trade expansion due to falling trade costs is 43.4 percent higher when falling
transportation costs are included. In the baseline calibration, the model predicts an
increase in export share of 26.6 percent due to falling tari®s. Adding transportation,
the model predicts an increase in trade share of 38.1 percent. (In the data, export
share increased by 138 percent.) While the total increase in trade share due to falling
trade costs depends on the elasticity, the extra impact that falling transportation costs
implies does not. Trade expansion is about 45 percent higher when improvements in
transportation are accounted for, independent of the elasticity.
Price Dispersion
The gap between domestic and foreign prices increases when transportation costs in-
crease. The price spread between the export price of a good and the import price in the
model is ¿(t) + PT(t). The model predicts constant or increasing price dispersion (de-
pending on the behavior of tari®s) during the period of the oil shocks due to increasing
transportation costs.
There is evidence that commodity price dispersion increased during the oil shocks.
Figure Eight shows the real spread between prices quoted at di®erent stages of the
logistics chain for number of commodities. Price dispersion signi¯cantly increases in
response to the oil shocks and declines thereafter.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Given the lack of data on the world transportation industry, the parameters that enter
the calibration cannot be estimated with a high degree of precision. In this section, I
examine the sensitivity of the results to di®erent parameterizations.
Productivity Growth and Trade Costs
If energy intensity is unchanged (°A = °B = °), the percentage point change in trans-
portation prices that results from an increase in productivity is given by the equation:
17¢PT = ¡TS ¤
1 ¡ °
°
Given a transportation share of 15.8 percent, a productivity growth rate of 0.7
percent implies a 0.1 annual percentage point decline in trade costs. Over the course of
forty years, that implies a 4 percentage point decline. Doubling the productivity growth
rate to 1.4 percent implies a 0.22 annual percentage point decline in trade costs or 8.7
percentage point decline over forty years.
Higher productivity growth reduces the relative impact of energy price changes
on trade costs. For an energy price spike to raise total trade costs when tari®s are
falling, transportation costs must increase. Transportation costs increase in response to
higher energy prices only if the higher energy costs overwhelms the fall in costs due to
productivity growth. When productivity is growing faster, energy prices must increase
more to lead to an increase in transportation prices.
Energy Prices and Trade Costs
The percentage point change in transportation prices that results from an increase in
energy prices is given by the equation:
¢PT = TS ¤ ES ¤ ¢PE
The impact of a change in the price of energy on the price of transportation is
greater for higher values of both transportation share TS and energy share ES. In what
follows, I will examine how di®erent values of TS and ES a®ect the change in the price
of transportation.
In the simulated economy in 1972, ES is equal to 7.42 percent and TS is equal
to 14.25 percent. Energy prices increased by 183.6 percent from 1972 to 1981. Over
this period, tari®s fall by 2.0 percentage points. For these values, transportation costs
increase by 1.94 percentage points. In what follows, I examine the magnitude of the
transportation cost increases for alternative values of TS and ES. (The following analysis
does not include changes in productivity.)
18Energy share for various modes of transportation in 1972 range from 3.5 for rail-
roads to 10.6 for air freight. Using this range of energy share, the range of transportation
cost increases is 0.92 percentage points to 2.78 percentage points.
Di®erent goods have di®erent transportation requirements. The nominal protec-
tion from transportation for individual commodities given in Finger and Yeats (1976)
ranges from 3 (Agricultural Machinery) to 39 percent (Sawn Wood). (This does not
include inland legs.) Scaling up to include the inland leg gives a range of 5 to 65 percent.
The range of transportation cost increases is 0.68 percentage points to 8.85 percentage
points.
With the alternative values for ES and TS, changes to transportation costs caused
by the oil crises are signi¯cant. Even at the low range of these estimates, energy costs
lead to a quantitatively important increase in transportation costs compared to the 2
percent decline in tari®s. The smallest impact (0.68 percentage points) is still a third
the size of the decline in tari®s and the upper range of the estimates are signi¯cantly
larger than the change in tari®s.
5 Discussion
5.1 Voyage Length
Additional evidence for the importance of energy costs for trade can be found by exam-
ining the distance a shipment is sent. Energy costs increase with the length of a voyage.
Therefore, we would expect that importers would attempt to mitigate an increase in
transportation costs due to energy shocks by importing more from nearby producers. In
fact, Hummels (1999) shows that importers do change the mix of importing countries
to minimize transportation costs. High energy prices should be associated with goods
being shipped shorter distances.
There is evidence that voyage length declined in response to higher energy costs.
The worldwide haul length declined. Figure Nine shows the average length of voyages
for world seaborne trade. After increasing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the average
voyage length falls in the mid-1970s. It begins to slowly grow in the mid-1980s.
Additional evidence can be found at lower levels of aggregation. In general,
19products with a high value to weight ratio are more vulnerable to transportation price
increases since a transit fees represent a larger share of delivered value. Therefore,
products with a high value per ton should be less a®ected than those with a low ratio.
The US Commodity Flow Survey collects data average length of haul of goods
for Economic Census years. I regress the change in haul length on the average value
per ton for two digit SIC code manufacturing industries. The variable ALH77 is the
percentage increase in average length of haul from 1972 to 1977. The variable ALH72 is
the percentage increase from 1963 to 1972. The variable VAL77 is the average value per
ton in 1977. Table 2 presents the results.
Table 2: Average Length of Haul Regressions








The positive coe±cient on VAL77 for the 1972 to 1977 period implies that average
haul length fell more (or grew less) for heavier products during the oil shock period. In
contrast, haul length growth was unrelated to shipment value before the oil shock. (Low
value industries' haul length grew signi¯cantly faster than high value industries from
1963 to 1967.) The oil shock seems to have had a larger e®ect on haul length for low
value shipments relative to high value shipments.
5.2 Other Explanations
The model in this paper shows that changes in transportation cost due to the Oil Crises
can account for the slowdown in trade expansion in the mid-1970s. In this section, I
consider alternative explanations.
20Non-Tari® Barriers
A potential alternative explanation is non-tari® barriers (NTBs). NTBs became a more
important trade issue around the time of the trade slowdown. Bhagwati (1988) notes
that NTBs increased during the mid-1970s in what is often referred to as the \New
Protectionism". However, there are weaknesses in the case for non-tari® barriers.
Relative to transportation costs and tari®s, NTBs have little e®ect on trade vol-
umes. Bhagwati (1988) notes that most NTBs are easily circumvented. He suggests that
they are enacted by politicians to appear to be providing protection to trade compet-
ing industries while providing little actual protection. Harrigan (1993) ¯nds that NTBs
were large in 1983 but ¯nds that they had little e®ect on trade relative to tari®s and
transportation costs.
While the timing of the rise of NTBs seems to match the trade slowdown, this
explanation requires a similar decline barriers in the mid-1980s. Time series data on
NTBs is di±cult to come by. Productivity Commission (2000) provides data on the
assistance to Australian industries from a variety of sources, including tari®s, NTBs and
subsidies. Assistance to Australian manufacturing mostly takes the form of tari®s and
non-tari® barriers. Since 1968, this assistance has been steadily declining. Overall trade
restrictiveness does not show an increase during the years of the trade slowdown.
Vertical Specialization
Yi (2003) argues that vertical specialization helps explain the apparent change in price-
import elasticity. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) present evidence that vertical integration
trade has become an important part of international trade. Yi (2003) suggests that
adding transportation costs would amplify his results.
The theory put forth in this paper emphasizing transportation changes is com-
plementary to vertical specialization. It may explain the timing of the large increase
in trade. Vertical specialization theory indicates that trade may expand in a non-linear
fashion as trade costs fall. Falling energy prices may explain why the big increase in
trade occurred in the mid-1980s. Transportation changes may be particularly important
in the 1970s, when energy prices changed a great deal, while more recent trade expansion
may owe more to increasing vertical specialization.
21The decline in transportation costs may have encouraged the increase in vertical
specialization. Breaking the production process into stages that are done in di®erent
locations incurs higher transportation costs than production that is done within a sin-
gle location. A part may be transported many times, incurring multiple shipping fees.
In addition, to maintain a su±cient supply of parts while keeping inventory costs low,
vertically integrated production often relies on faster, more expensive modes of trans-
portation. Trucks and air freight o®er same day or overnight service, but at a much
higher cost than rail and water transit. When transportation costs are high, it may be
impractical to ship parts many times using relatively expensive modes of transportation.
However, as these costs decline, the gains to vertical integration trade may outweigh the
additional cost of transportation. It would be fruitful to examine the role of transporta-
tion in vertical specialization.
5.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that the oil crises of the 1970s increased transportation costs and
can account for the trade slowdown in the mid-1970s. I add an energy using transporta-
tion sector to a simple model of trade and ¯nd that energy prices can lead to a large
enough increase in transportation costs to o®set the decline in tari®s in the 1970s.
Transportation may be a fruitful avenue of inquiry to investigate the e®ect of the
oil shocks on other aspects of the economy. For example, it could be used to examine the
e®ects of the oil shocks on productivity growth. Trade competing ¯rms and industries are
typically found to be more productive than those that are protected. An interesting topic
to address is the role of the trade slowdown in the worldwide productivity slowdown. In
the context of the Nineteenth Century United States, Schmitz (2003) shows that reduc-
tions in transportation costs can increase productivity by allowing more specialization.
Changes in transportation prices may have had similar e®ects in the Twentieth Century.
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25A Appendix: Data Sources
A.1 Trade Data
World export share is ratio of the indices of real world exports and GDP from the World
Trade Organization's International Trade Statistics in 2002 multiplied by nominal world
export share in 1990 from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
A.2 Tari® Data
Tari®s are \World Tari®s" from Yi (2003).
A.3 Energy Data
Energy prices are US producer prices weighted by usage from US Department of Energy's
Annual Energy Review de°ated by the GDP de°ator.
A.4 Freight Rates
Australian coastal shipping and price index comes from Australia's Bureau of Transport
and Regional Economics Information Sheet 19.
All US revenue per ton-mile series are de°ated by the US GDP de°ator. Railroad
data are from the Association of American Railroads' Yearbook of Railroad Facts. Truck
and barge data are from the Eno Foundation's Transportation in America.
A.5 Energy Revenue Share Data
The water transportation data are from Statistics Canada's Water Transportation.
Civil aviation data are from Statistics Canada's Canadian Civil Aviation. Data
refer to all civil aviation, including passenger transportation.
Railroad data are from the Association of American Railroads' Yearbook of Rail-
road Facts.
26A.6 Commodity Prices
All commodity price spreads are de°ated by the US GDP de°ator.
Sugar spread is Caribbean/UK Freight and Insurance Element from the Interna-
tional Sugars Organization's Sugar Yearbook. The portion of the series in British pounds
is converted to US dollars using Sugar Yearbook's conversion factor.
Cotton spread is mill price minus farm price from US Department of Agriculture's
Cotton Yearbook.
Corn spread is Argentina CIF North Sea Ports spot price minus US No. 3 yellow
FOB Gulf Ports spot price from the World Bank's Commodity Trade and Price Trends.
A.7 Seaborne Trade
Average length of haul is calculated by dividing \Tons-Miles" by \Tons" from Fearnley's
Maritime Trade data available in the OECD's Maritime Transport.
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Export Share TariffsFigure Two:


































































































































Railroads Trucks (Class I) Air BargeFigure Five:














































Water Transportation Civil Aviation Price RailroadsFigure Six:




























Trade cost No Energy Tariffs OnlyFigure Seven:















































































Corn Cotton SugarFigure Nine:
Average Length of Voyage
World Seaborne Freight
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
1
0
0
0
 
M
i
l
e
s